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This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards (or monetary 
policy committees) across countries. We discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. 
The empirical relevance of these factors is examined using a new dataset that covers the 
de jure membership size of 84 central bank boards at the end of 2003. We find that larger and 
more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with 
floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have 
larger boards. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Size matters, in particular when it comes to central bank boards or monetary policy 
committees (MPCs).1  While monetary policy may be a “science,” it is hardly an exact one; it 
operates in an environment surrounded by considerable uncertainty. As a result, the way 
MPCs exploit information and agree on decisions may be critical for the quality and success 
of monetary policy. Current research has particularly emphasized the importance of central 
bank organization—and especially the size of central bank boards or MPCs—in this regard.2
Specifically, academics and policy makers have recently stressed the advantages of 
larger MPCs.3 For instance, Blinder (2006) and Blinder and Morgan (2005) argue that 
multiple decision makers make fewer mistakes and better decisions when information is 
incomplete—an argument that is loosely based on Condorcet’s jury theorem. Gerling, 
Grüner, Kiel, and Schulte (2005) summarize a larger literature from a game theoretic 
perspective; they argue that larger MPCs are particularly attractive if information is not 
public in nature. Auriol and Robert (2007) note that, in general, true representation of a 
                                                 
1 To avoid confusion, we will hereinafter generally use the terms MPC or central bank board, instead of the 
various specific national terms describing the board, committee, council, or body in charge of deciding whether 
to change the monetary policy stance to achieve a specified target. 
2 Other features of central bank design may also have the potential to affect the quality of monetary policy 
decision-making; these include: meeting procedures (consensus decisions, voting arrangements, etc.), whether 
board members are full-time employees with the central bank or part-time external members, and if there are 
government representative(s), if any, with voting rights or the ability to temporarily postpone decisions. These 
factors, although important, are outside the scope of this paper. 
3 Our framework is related to the recent discussion on the size of boards of corporations. Reviewing the 
literature, Hermalin and Weisbach (2001, p. 31) note that: “Board composition [share of outside versus inside 
directors] is not related to corporate performance, while board size is negatively related to corporate 
performance. Both board composition and size do appear to be related to the quality of the board’s decisions 
regarding CEO replacement, acquisitions, poison pills, and executive compensation.” However, in the case of 
commercial corporations, the primary objective (e.g., to maximize shareholder wealth) is often clearer than for 
central banks. Furthermore, central bank boards typically have a smaller role, or none at all, in the appointment 
of the governor and in compensation decisions than commercial boards have.  
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politically and economically diverse area will require a larger number of representatives. The 
surveys by Fujiki (2005), Sibert (2006), Vandenbussche (2006), and Berger (2006) provide a 
comprehensive overview over this rapidly expanding literature.4
As Goodfriend (2005, p. 85) remarks, however, “the efficient size of a policy 
committee might vary across countries.” Countries differ along various economic, political, 
and institutional dimensions and (some of) these characteristics may also shape the 
advantages of larger MPCs. For instance, the argument to increase board size to achieve 
better information processing appears to be of particular relevance when an economy is large 
or characterized by considerable diversity across regions and industries. Similarly, a 
country’s political institutions may matter for MPC size, with less democratic regimes 
perhaps preferring a smaller board (since a large MPC could effectively provide insulation 
from political pressures).5,6 Finally, MPC size is probably also affected by other elements of 
central bank design such as the institutional functions performed by a central bank. For 
instance, if the central bank enjoys full autonomy over both policy targets and instruments, 
the MPC may be larger than when the central bank’s autonomy is more limited.  
                                                 
4 Schein (1999) is a related contribution from the business literature that looks at group-based decision making. 
Also see the helpful survey in Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007), who, like Sibert (2006) and Vandenbussche 
(2006), discuss contributions coming from outside economics proper. 
5 One argument along this line is that large board size combined with anonymous majority voting allows 
individual board members to claim to have been outvoted or otherwise dominated in the decision-making 
process. 
6 Related to size, it may in practice also make a difference if some of the MPC members are full-time 
employees of the central bank (i.e., “internal members”) whose future careers may depend on the chairman of 
the MPC, typically the governor, or the members are “external” members. In the case of the former, the meeting 
dynamics may also be influenced by Keynes’s “beauty contest factor,” where these members may also be 
tempted to refine their own interventions in line with those they expect the chairman will favor. The special role 
of the chairman (see, for instance, Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea 2004) and the issue of internal and 
external members (see, for example, Tuladhar 2005, who provides such information on MPCs in inflation– 
targeting countries) are indeed important, but lie outside the scope of this paper. 
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A case in point is the recent discussion of the design of the European Central Bank’s 
(ECB’s) 19-member Governing Council, in which there is at least one representative from 
each member country of the monetary union (see, for instance, Baldwin, Berglöf, Giavazzi, 
and Widgren, 2001; Berger, de Haan, and Inklaar, 2004). In light of the ongoing increase in 
euro area membership, the ECB has limited the (future) number of voting members to 21. 
Even with this restriction, however, the Council appears to be relatively large; most of the 
82 central banks surveyed by Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, and Sterne (2000) have a MPC 
with about 5–10 members. It is still unclear, though, whether the ECB Governing Council is 
indeed exceptionally large or just a manifestation of a general pattern where larger countries 
tend to endow their central banks with larger MPCs. 
Despite the considerable interest in MPC size, there is surprisingly little evidence 
about the cross-country variation in central bank boards and their determinants. Fry, Julius, 
Mahadeva, Roger, and Sterne (2000) document differences in MPC size across countries but 
provide no explanations. Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007) review a small number of potential 
determinants of MPC size. However, to the best of our knowledge, a systematic, broad-based 
empirical analysis of differences in MPC size is missing. 
In this paper, we aim to fill this void by systematically characterizing differences in 
the membership size of decision-making bodies of central banks around the world. Since 
central banks often operate various boards, committees, and councils, we focus on the central 
bank’s implementation board (or MPC) that makes decisions on whether and when to change 
policy instruments to achieve a given monetary policy target.7  
                                                 
7 Lybek and Morris (2004) provide a more detailed discussion of the various functions of central bank boards. 
 
 - 4 - 
Our results indicate that board size is indeed strongly and plausibly associated with a 
number of country-specific characteristics. We find, for instance, that board size is related to 
country size and country heterogeneity as well as to a country’s political institutions. Also, 
MPC size is often associated with other central bank characteristics.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a 
detailed discussion of possible determinants of MPC size. Section III presents the data and 
the empirical results, and Section IV provides a brief conclusion. 
 
II.   POSSIBLE DETERMINANTS OF CENTRAL BANK BOARD SIZE 
The size of the central bank board is an important feature of central bank design. In 
practice, the decision on the number of board members appears to reflect various factors, 
including the political environment in which the decision on MPC size is made. In fact, one 
way to picture the decision process on board size is purely political. For instance, the number 
of central bank board members could be the result of a bargaining process that involves 
different interest groups (e.g., the financial sector, trade unions, or export industries) aiming 
at direct or indirect representation in the MPC.8 Alternatively, the decision on MPC size 
could take the form of a conscious design decision of a decision-maker based on social or 
private preferences and subject to more or less binding political constraints.9 Following the 
                                                 
8 A case in point are the recent amendments to the central bank law of Hungary in 2004, where the balance in 
the monetary policy committee was changed by increasing the number of members. 
9 Provided the central bank independence paradigm is acknowledged, the design-scenario may be more relevant 
for boards that primarily make decisions on whether to change monetary policy instruments to achieve a 
specified target (instrument autonomy) than for policy boards that are also involved in determining the target of 
the central bank (target autonomy) or even deciding on its primary objective (goal autonomy), which is much 
more normative. 
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more recent literature, however, we will organize our discussion of the determinants of 
central bank board size around the trade-off of (some of the more obvious) costs and benefits 
of an increasing number of board members.10
 
A.   The Basic Trade-Off 
On the benefit side, the most prominent argument in favor of increasing the number 
of MPC members is that larger MPCs could be in a better position to process, analyze, and 
interpret economic information—ultimately leading to better monetary policy decisions—
than individuals relying mostly on their own information and judgment. Multiple MPC 
members are able to pool information and exploit divisions of labor in information 
processing.11 The argument has been formalized, among others, by Gerlach-Kristen (2006) 
and Berk and Bierut (2004); supportive experimental evidence is produced by Blinder and 
Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli, Proudman, and Talbot (2005).12 Already Blinder (1998) 
noted that in a committee decisions tend to regress toward the mean, making it very difficult 
for idiosyncratic (or extreme) views to prevail.  
                                                 
10 See, among others, Goodfriend (2005), Berger (2006), and Sibert (2006). It should be noted that the forces 
shaping any political process relevant for the decision on MPC size may be somewhat similar in nature to the 
forces considered in a cost-benefit approach. 
11 MPC members may contribute by their differences in various ways, namely by the: (i) underlying model, 
meaning the underlying paradigms in which they believe; (ii) their experiences, meaning how they “estimate” 
the parameters in their model; (iii) the information set they use as input in their model; and not least (iv) 
different objective functions, which explicitly or implicitly may differ from the primary objective of the MPC.  
12 Other contributions pointing in the same direction include Méon (2006) and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006). 
Méon (2006, p. 1), for instance, shows that: “The volatility of the policy is smaller the smaller the volatility of 
members’ preferences, smaller the larger the size of the committee, and smaller than if it was chosen by a single 
member.” Sibert (2006), however, argues that decision-making by committee may not necessarily result in 
moderation. 
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On the cost side, a plausible conjecture is that larger MPCs will generally imply 
greater effort from all involved for a given decision problem which may translate into less 
effective monetary policy making.13 An important aspect is communication among members 
(and the resulting dynamics of the discussion). For instance, it seems obvious that even if the 
exchange of ideas at the preparatory stage of a decision is limited to a solitary statement by 
MPC members addressing their colleagues, larger MPCs would require more time than 
smaller MPCs in reaching a decision. Moreover, actual decision-making costs are likely to 
have a non-linear component. If MPC members regularly “sound each other out” during 
meetings (see, for instance, Barber 2001), the time requirement for preparing a decision will 
rise exponentially in the number of members (Berger 2006).14 Moreover, individual 
representation at the board becomes less important as the number of decision makers 
increases so that the gains from diversity of skills and perspectives of members become 
smaller for larger central bank boards.15
 
 
                                                 
(continued…) 
13 Sibert (2006, p. 1) notes, in similar fashion, that, “[a]s a result of shirking and coordination problems, smaller 
committees may be better than larger ones and the optimal size for a committee is an empirical issue.” 
14 If there are n MPC members, the number of bilateral discussions is ½ (n2-n). The need for preparatory 
communication will be especially pronounced in central bank environments given to consensus-based decision 
making. This includes roughly half of the more than 80 central banks surveyed by Fry et al. (2000). The view 
that increasing MPC membership size may reduce the effectiveness of policy-making is also bolstered by real-
world experience. The German Bundesbank, for instance, asserts that its 1992 MPC reform triggered by 
German unification helped to prevent an increase in MPC size which “would have greatly complicated that 
body’s decision-making processes” (Deutsche Bundesbank 1992, p. 50). More recently, the European Central 
Bank (2003, p. 83) has expressed the fear that the anticipated increase in the number of national central bank 
governors attending euro area MPC meetings after EMU enlargement “will not necessarily make deliberations 
easier”. 
15 Blinder and Morgan (2005) argue that small but not-too-large-groups of individuals may reach “better” 
decisions at speeds broadly comparable to an individual. As groups increase, however, individual members may 
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B.   Determinants of Monetary Policy Committee Size 
The trade-off between costs and benefits determining optimal MPC size is likely to be 
influenced by various country characteristics, which can be exploited empirically. In what 
follows, we present a number of relevant and empirically testable hypotheses along this line, 
aiming to make the argument for an association between MPC size and country 
characteristics operational. 
 
Country size and heterogeneity 
As a starting point, it seems safe to assume that a central bank’s requirements for 
information processing are a (positive) function of (within-)country diversity and country 
size. For instance, for economies with complex structures, a large number of central bank 
board members might be particularly useful, allowing a review in detail of the (often diverse) 
information from various sectors and regions (Goodfriend 2005). Also, it is often larger 
currency areas that host a more heterogeneous population with diverging preferences and/or 
varying institutional and cultural backgrounds, possibly weighing on monetary policy.16 For 
instance, if larger countries tend to produce more federal political structures, these structures 
may more easily translate into the presence of regional representatives in the MPC.17 Finally, 
                                                                                                                                                       
have a stronger incentive to “freeride” on the information processing efforts of others, especially if information 
processing is a costly activity, which will lead to growing inefficiencies (e.g., Sibert 2006).  
16 Of course, there are also political-economic factors that could translate heterogeneity into larger MPC size. 
For instance, in the absence of proper democratic institutions, a more politically diverse population might 
require a larger MPC to represent all relevant interest groups, possibly including external members. We return 
to this issue below. 
17 On regional representation in MPCs, see, among others, Berger and de Haan (2002), Meade and Sheets 
(2005), and Berger (2006). 
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larger countries may be more independent in their monetary policy, which may make having 
larger MPCs more worthwhile. In sum, we hypothesize that measures of country size such as 
land area or population are positively correlated with MPC size. Similarly, measures of a 
country’s cultural or political fragmentation may have a positive influence on the size of the 
MPC. 
 
Development and openness 
Another group of empirically identifiable factors that potentially affect MPC size are 
the economy’s state of economic development and its degree of external openness. One 
plausible conjecture that links central bank organization to the level of economic development 
is that the existence of a more elaborate monetary policy framework, including perhaps a 
larger MPC, may be a positive function of the average income level in a country. More 
specifically, larger and more developed economies could be less inclined to opt for simple 
monetary rules (such as a fixed exchange rate) and introduce more complex strategies (such 
as forward-looking inflation targeting), which may require larger MPCs to manage.18 Also, 
countries at higher income levels and with more developed financial markets should have a 
larger supply of well-educated staff and (well-qualified) potential MPC members, thereby 
loosen any possible constraint imposed on MPC size at lower income levels. Furthermore, 
more developed and dynamic financial markets may result in more frequent changes in the 
                                                 
18 Another link pointing in that direction is that more financial development means that more people depend on 
financial assets and hence are more vulnerable to inflation (Posen, 1995). As they demand more central bank 
autonomy and accountability, this could imply the establishment of larger central bank boards. In less 
developed countries, which typically have a younger population, the preference toward price stability may be 
smaller. 
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monetary transmission mechanism which implies the need for more balanced information 
when adjusting the monetary policy instruments. 
On openness, Romer (1993) has argued that economies more open to international 
trade are more sensitive to currency fluctuations and this sensitivity should lead to a more 
disciplined economic policy overall. If openness is indeed making the MPC’s life easier, by 
imposing, for instance, greater discipline on fiscal policy, a fewer number of board numbers 
are needed in more open economies.19 The same should hold, other things equal, for 




A larger MPC may also have advantages for political economy reasons. Diversity in 
terms of language or culture may increase the attractiveness of a larger MPC which would 
allow fuller representation of varying interests and thereby increase the likelihood of gaining 
political legitimacy. Along similar lines, it could be argued that more developed democratic 
                                                 
19 Put differently, the size of MPCs is less relevant for (the costs of) decision-making in cases where the central 
bank runs monetary policy for a small, open, and highly integrated economy so that there is a priori little room 
for independent policy-making in the first place. 
20 Empirically, a high degree of openness at period t may or may not be highly correlated with measures of 
business cycle correlation in the past. D’Amato and Martina (2005) argue on theoretical grounds that a high 
degree of business cycle correlation across countries should provide incentives to decrease central bank 
independence. If this was correct, and larger MPCs and central bank independence were substitutes (see below), 
this would lead us to expect a positive correlation between a correlation measure and MPC size. 
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institutions allow for greater diversity in opinion and preferences and, therefore, may be a 
factor in favor of a more sizable MPC.21
Another potentially relevant argument from a political economy perspective is related 
to the incentive of governments to dominate monetary policy for fiscal reasons. At the 
extreme, this may lead to fiscal determinacy of the price level, where monetary policy is 
forced to fully accommodate excessive fiscal behavior, including financing quasi-fiscal 
activities, and to allow runaway inflation to deflate the level of public debt (see, e.g., 
Woodford 2003). At a less drastic level, government officials may put pressure on the MPC 
to ease monetary policy and thereby lower the interest burden for the public finances. To 
insulate monetary policy from these pressures, optimal central bank design would aim for a 
high degree of central bank independence (see, e.g., Rogoff 1985), which may include 
establishing a large MPC, since larger boards may be less easily swayed by government 
influence.22 As a consequence, we might observe a positive correlation between MPC size 
and measures of fiscal pressure. Similarly, under the assumption that such pressures are 
present, MPC size may be complemented by stricter limits on central bank financing of fiscal 
deficits.23  
 
                                                 
21 These traditions could also influence the nature of the decision-making process, such as the prevalence of 
consensus-based traditions, majority voting, or leadership style of the MPC’s president. “Group think,” the risk 
that one or a few charismatic persons dominate and prevent valid critical questions be addressed, may be less 
problematic in larger boards. A more detailed discussion can be found in Berger (2006). 
22 See the discussion on central bank independence below. 
23 Strictly speaking, the latter argument is an element of central bank design rather than the political 
environment (see following section). In practice, deficit financing is increasingly being alleviated by central 
bank legislation explicitly prohibiting direct or indirect central bank financing of the fiscal deficits and the 
financing of quasi-fiscal activities.  
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Central Bank Independence 
Finally, if the membership size of the central bank board is part of a multidimensional 
design process of central bank organization, we may expect that other design choices are 
reflected in MPC size as well. Plausibly, MPC size might be related to its degree of 
independence, the monetary policy or exchange rate regime, or elements of its organizational 
structure such as term length or staffing. We will discuss the role of central bank 
independence first. 
There is reason to expect that central banks with greater autonomy from the 
government (e.g., with the authority to prioritize their objectives and specify the target to 
pursue generally) are likely to have larger MPCs. This could be, as discussed above, because 
a larger number of MPC members might mean that the central bank is less easily pressured 
by a government than an individual. One relevant factor in this regard will be that, under 
staggered contracts, the share of new MPC members to be reappointed or replaced by a 
government at any point in time is a decreasing function of MPC size.  
Another link between central bank independence and MPC size could be the fact that 
the informational advantages possible associated from larger MPCs become more relevant 
once the MPC gains independence and is actually in charge of monetary policy. As Blinder 
(2006, p. 107) remarks, “[i]n a number of countries, the movement toward committees went 
hand-in-glove with the spread of central bank independence. When the central bank was just 
following orders communicated by the government, there was not much reason to have a 
committee on the other end of the phone. An individual governor sufficed—and also limited 
the phone bill. But as central bank independence was granted in one country after another, 
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the choice between an individual and a committee became a live one—both in theory and in 
practice.” 
 
Exchange Rate Regime 
In similar fashion, the monetary policy strategy and the monetary policy regime in 
which a central bank operates may be relevant determinants of MPC size. The most 
important distinction here is the exchange rate regime. Decisions on changing interest rates 
require less deliberation and forward-looking analysis under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
where the central bank essentially follows the monetary policy of the anchor country, than 
monetary policy under flexible or floating exchange rates. As a consequence, the potential 
information gathering and processing advantages of a larger MPC will be significantly more 
relevant when a central bank operates, for instance, an inflation targeting approach under 
floating exchange rates. The empirical implication is a positive correlation between more 
floating exchange rate arrangements and MPC size. This is corroborated by the observation 
that the post Bretton-Woods trend toward floating exchange rates and inflation targeting 
regimes often went along with increased central bank autonomy (Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf 
2003), which, as discussed above, may create further incentives to increase MPC size. 
 
Organization and Other Central Bank Characteristics 
Finally, one may argue that there is a negative association between MPC size and the 
(envisaged) average term length of MPC members since smaller groups require longer terms 
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to ensure continuity.24 Alternatively, larger groups are able to accommodate higher 
fluctuation frequencies without endangering the independence of the MPC from the 
government (which is likely to be involved in the nomination of new members).25
Another factor that might be associated with MPC size is the number of central bank 
staff. A possible link between the two variables is the number of functions performed by the 
central bank, which may require both more staff and a larger MPC (e.g., if the MPC has also 
duties other than to decide on monetary policy).26 The central bank’s operating expenditures 
may be another proxy for the functions performed by the central bank. Finally, path 
dependencies (possibly captured by the age of the institution) may play a role for MPC size, 
with younger institutions being plausibly characterized by (yet) smaller boards. 
 
III.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In the following, we test the above predictions empirically. Our strategy is to examine 
the association between MPC size and country characteristics in a very general fashion. 
Instead of emphasizing a particular variable or estimation method, we use a (large) number 
of alternative measures and a variety of simple econometric specifications to identify 
possible structural correlations in the data. This approach also helps to take account of a few 
data limitations for individual variables. We begin this section by describing our data, and 
                                                 
24 Another possible link could be the so-called stabilization bias of monetary policy (e.g., Woodford 2003): if 
larger groups mean slower decision-making, larger MPCs could be a means to introduce optimal inertia into 
interest rate setting—albeit perhaps not an efficient one. See Mirzoev (2004) for an argument for lowering the 
meeting frequency of MPCs to achieve the same effect. 
25 The literature on central bank independence, term length and staggered contracts is also relevant here. See 
Waller (1989, 1992, 2002), Waller and Walsh (1996). 
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then turn to testing the relationships between MPC size and various country characteristics, 
including features of central bank design. 
 
A.   Data Description 
At the heart of our data set is the MPC size data obtained from Lybek and Morris 
(2004). This publication surveys 101 central bank laws (covering 113 countries) at the end of 
2003 and classifies the governance structure of central banks along various dimensions. 
Lybek and Morris (2004) distinguish between different types of central bank boards (policy 
boards, implementation boards, pure supervisory boards, and advisory bodies) depending on 
the type of autonomy. We use information on the most relevant and powerful central bank 
board, the “implementation board,” i.e., the body that decides whether to change monetary 
policy instruments to achieve a specified target. Since Lybek and Morris (2004) have 
grouped MPCs into size classes of three members, we use effectively a board size index that 
takes the value of one if the MPC consists of 1–3 members, the value of two if there are 4–6 
members, and so on.27 Figure 1 provides a histogram of our MPC size measure. The 84 
countries included in our sample are listed in Appendix I.28
                                                                                                                                                       
26 Alternatively, there could be specialized “boards” to deal with other functions. The Reserve Bank of 
Australia is a case in point having a special Payment System Board.  
27 Lybek and Morris (2004) provide no information on the precise number of MPC members. It should be 
noted, however, that also some central bank laws stipulate no fixed number but give a range for the number of 
required board members. Another qualification of the Lybek and Morris data is that they focus on boards and 
committees and therefore provide no information on central banks where the governor alone is responsible for 
decisions on how to implement the policy. Thus, de facto our smallest size category for board membership 
covers boards with 2–3 members. 
28 The main difference to the Lybek and Morris (2004) sample of 101 central bank laws is that we drop central 
banks that are involved in a multilateral currency union (since these central banks have either no responsibility 
for monetary policy or make decisions on monetary policy for a larger currency area). 
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Our accompanying data on country characteristics and central bank features come 
from a number of different sources. Most of the data on country characteristics are taken 
from Rose (2006), who has compiled a large and comprehensive data set of country 
attributes, including physical, cultural, economic, political, geographic, and social 
phenomena. To this data set, we add information on various central bank features such as the 
term length of board members, the type of legal independence, the establishment year, staff 
size, and operational expenses of the central bank. This information is mainly obtained from 
Lybek and Morris (2004); other sources are the Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory, Fry 
et al. (2000), and Ize (2006). Finally, we have compiled macroeconomic data (e.g., on a 
country’s fiscal position) from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics. We also use three different exchange rate regime classifications: the well-known 
de facto classifications from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2004), and the de jure classification from the IMF (2003). Detailed sources for variables are 
tabulated in Appendix II. Appendix III provides descriptive statistics.29
 
                                                 
29 Most explanatory variables are either time-invariant or contemporaneous to MPC size. The underlying 
hypothesis is that the size of MPCs (as any element of central bank design) is subject to constant re-evaluation, 
either through the relevant authorities or the underlying political process. If this is indeed the case, we expect 
our explanatory variables to show a significant impact on MPC size. The alternative hypothesis is that MPC size 
is determined in a “one shot” game or design decision and not subject to change. In this case, finding a 
significant relationship with current country characteristics would be less likely, at least if the determinants of 
MPC size change over time. In practice, however, with many of the explanatory variables showing considerable 
inertia themselves (and the recent wave of central bank reforms having changed MPC sizes in a number of 
countries including, for instance, the U.K. and Sweden), the distinction between both views is somewhat less 
sharp than what one might think. Ultimately, however, this is an empirical question. 
 
 - 16 - 
B.   Methodology 
We now turn to the correlates of central bank board size. We estimate both simple 
bivariate models and models augmented with a few key controls. In particular, we estimate 
regressions of the form: 
 
MPC = α + β x +  γ Y + ε 
 
where MPC is our ordered MPC (or board) size index, x is the variable of interest, Y is a set 
of control variables and ε is a well-behaved residual. Due to the discrete categorical nature of 
our dependent variable, we estimate our equation using ordered probit techniques. 
 
C.   Bivariate Results 
Tables 1–5 present the benchmark estimation results. For each variable, we report 
three sets of estimates. The first column records the slope coefficients obtained from simple 
bivariate estimation.30 In column 2, we report the results of an augmented regression, in 
which population and per capita income are added as control variables.31 Finally, the last 
column presents the bivarate results with the MPC size measure transformed into a binary 
index that takes the value of one if the MPC comprises more than six members and zero 
otherwise; these results are based on standard probit estimates. In practice, it turns out that all 
                                                 
30 In the working paper version of this paper, we provide accompanying scatter plots. 
31 We have also experimented with other sets of controls (e.g., central bank staff). The main findings were 
basically unaffected. 
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of our key findings are robust to this transformation of board size into small and large boards; 
this also suggests that our results are not sensitive to outliers.32 In the following, we group 
variables along the lines of arguments outlined in the previous section. 
Table 1 examines the linkage between (various indicators of) country size and MPC 
size. Most of the estimated coefficients are positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that larger countries tend to have larger central bank boards. Reviewing the results in detail, 
the measure that is most directly related to membership size of a committee is a country’s 
total population. The estimated coefficient on this variable is strongly positive (across all 
specifications) and statistically highly significant, indicating that more populous countries 
have more MPC members. For other useful proxies of country size, such as land area (as a 
measure of a country’s physical extension) or the gross domestic product (as a proxy for 
economic mass), the results are basically identical (which is not totally surprising given the 
generally strong positive correlation between these measures). 
There is also some evidence that heterogeneity is associated with larger central bank 
boards (Table 2). As argued in Section II, greater diversity provides good reason for the 
creation of larger MPCs. This reasoning, however, may be more relevant for policy boards 
than for more technical boards such as MPCs that determine whether to change interest rates 
to achieve a specified target. To explore this issue empirically, we examine a broad range of 
variables on population heterogeneity, including various measures of ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious diversity, indicators of the spread in income distribution and geographic location, 
and a country’s political fragmentation as measured by the number of its first-order 
                                                 
32 As another test for possible non-linearities, we re-estimated all equations with squared values of the variables 
of interest entered; see below. 
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administrative divisions. While most of the coefficients on these variables take a positive 
sign, only the point estimate on the ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure, a variable that 
is available for only a small share of the sample, is statistically different from zero. The 
number of a country’s administrative units is also slightly (positively) correlated with central 
bank board size. 
In comparison, there is only weak evidence that measures of a country’s level of 
economic development or the degree of external openness influence MPC size; results are 
reported in Table 3. Reviewing the coefficients, there is only one relationship of reasonable 
statistical strength: landlocked countries have smaller boards. Broadly in line with this 
finding, we find that trade openness is consistently negatively associated with MPC size, 
although the coefficient is not statistically different from zero in any of the specifications. In 
contrast, most variables typically associated with economic and financial development and 
material well-being neither shows the expected sign nor are they statistically significant. 
The empirical results for indicators of a country’s political regime, tabulated in 
Table 4, seem to suggest that well-established democratic institutions and countries with 
stronger governance performance are associated with larger central bank boards. In terms of 
statistical significance, however, results appear to be somewhat mixed. In the simple 
bivariate specification, none of the coefficients on measures of institutional quality is 
statistically different from zero. Still, for some variables, the estimated coefficients at least 
border conventional levels of significance. Moreover, when we control for size and income, 
the estimated coefficients increase in magnitude and become statistically highly significant. 
At a more detailed level, it turns out that the standard Polity IV scores (democracy, 
autocracy, polity), which comprise composite measures of institutionalized characteristics of 
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the political regime, are weakly but consistently linked with MPC size across specifications. 
Countries with open and democratic political institutions tend to have large MPCs, while 
countries with autocratic structures have relatively small MPCs, though none of the nine 
coefficients is statistically different from zero. The estimates for the Freedom House measure 
on the state of civil liberties (political rights, civil rights) are not only supportive to this 
hypothesized relationship but also somewhat stronger statistically; the results indicate that 
“free” countries (as measured by low scores) have on average more members on their central 
bank boards than countries with a low freedom ranking. Finally, we experiment with several 
indicators on various dimensions of democracy, governance, and anti-corruption (voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law)––measures that were compiled by the World Bank. The 
results seem to support the idea that a better quality of governance is accompanied by larger 
MPCs. Most notably, the voice and accountability measure, which is an indicator of the 
extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection of their 
government, is significantly positively related to MPC size in the augmented model.33  
In a final iteration, we find that larger government debt (in percent of GDP) is often 
associated with larger MPCs. However, the estimate is drawn from a relatively limited 
sample of countries, and no such relation can be found for the fiscal deficit. 
Table 5 examines the association between the size of MPCs and other central bank 
features. We begin with several (binary) measures of central bank independence, taken from 
Lybek and Morris (2004) and a recent Bank of England survey among central banks (Fry et 
                                                 
33 The indicator summarizes a number of aspects of the political process, civil liberties, and political rights. 
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al., 2000). Overall, the evidence is mixed. Most of the legal measures obtained from Lybek 
and Morris, classifying different types of legal autonomy of a central bank, are uncorrelated 
with the number of board members.34 Some results based on Fry et al.’s (2000) independence 
scores, in contrast, indicate that more independent central banks have relatively larger 
boards, thereby providing mild support for Blinder (2006); these results, however, are 
derived from a smaller sample.35 Moreover, there is a positive correlation between the extent 
to which there are limits on central bank financing of government deficits and MPC size (in 
the augmented specification). 
A country’s exchange rate regime appears to be a useful proxy for the complexity of 
the central bank’s monetary policy strategy. Based on the most commonly used de jure and 
de facto exchange rate regime classifications, we have compiled binary measures for both 
hard-fixed and fully free-floating exchange rates (leaving the various intermediate forms of 
exchange rate pegs and inconclusive regimes as a control group). While the coefficients on 
the dummy variables for a fixed exchange rate regime (which are expected to be negative) 
are rarely significant in our regressions, the estimated coefficients on the floating exchange 
rate dummies often take on a significantly positive sign, implying that countries with flexible 
exchange rates tend to have larger boards. 
                                                 
34 Note that different types of autonomy (goal autonomy, target autonomy, instrument autonomy, and limited or 
no autonomy) refers to the type of decisions the central bank determines, but that the quality of independence 
depends on a range of other factors discussed in, for instance, Lybek (1998, 1999). 
35 We also tried a number of alternative measures of central bank independence that are frequently used in the 
literature, without much success. For most of these measures, sample size gets extremely small when member 
countries of the euro area (which are not covered in our analysis) are removed. 
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Concerning the term length of board members, we explore two features: the (de jure) 
term length in years, and whether the term length is stipulated in the central bank law. 
Neither coefficient is statistically different from zero.36
Finally, we find a significant (positive) correlation between the size of a central bank 
and the size of the central bank board. Central banks with more staff and higher operating 
expenditures (and, thus, possibly more functions) also operate larger MPCs, while recently 
established central banks tend to have smaller boards, although only the former relations are 
significant at conventional statistical levels. 
 
D.   Nonlinear Specification 
In most cases, linear models appear to capture the correlation between MPC size and 
its possible determinants reasonably well. Still, to allow for possible non-linearities, we also 
estimate our ordered probit models with quadratic terms.  
Table 6 presents the results. Reassuringly, almost all variables for which we find a 
significant non-linear effect on MPC size were also relevant determinants of MPC size in the 
linear specification; that is, they produced significant coefficients in at least one of the 
specifications reported in Tables 1–5. In addition, the target independence score becomes a 
significant determinant of MPC size, thereby reinforcing the bivariate results for other 
indicators of central bank independence. Other variables, in contrast, lose their significance 
in the non-linear model, such as real GDP and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
                                                 
36 Our measure of term length for MPC members is obtained from Lybek and Morris (2004); the measure is 
highly positively correlated with equivalent information for central bank governors that is reported in the 
Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory. 
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A second observation is that the majority of variables display, if anything, a concave 
relationship with MPC size.37 This holds for population, administrative divisions, economic 
security, government effectiveness, rule of law, debt, and the number of central bank staff. 
The estimation results imply that the marginal benefits of increasing MPC size are declining 
in the relevant country characteristic. That is, a given increase in population size, for 
instance, seems to have a smaller impact on MPC size at lower population levels. 
Our results for the term length of board members deviate from these two general 
findings. The term length of board members is significantly associated with MPC size only in 
the non-linear specification. Also, the relationship is convex rather than concave; board 
members tend to have longer legislated terms in both relatively large and relatively small 
MPCs. 
 
E.   Multivariate Results 
Next, we aim to explain cross-country differences in MPC size by combining various 
explanatory variables. The aim of this exercise is twofold. First, we are interested in 
exploring the robustness of our empirical findings, after controlling for the effect of other 
factors on MPC size. Second, we want to explore the empirical fit of our specification (i.e., 
the extent to which we are able to explain the variation in MPC size in our sample). 
Our empirical approach is essentially guided by data availability; it is constrained by 
possible multicollinearity. Specifically, we select from each group of determinants a 
                                                 
37 Using the ordered probit coefficients can be misleading in this respect, but we find very similar results based 
on the OLS models. Results are not shown. 
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representative variable that has a particularly strong bivariate correlation with central bank 
board size and is available for a large fraction of the sample. To this baseline specification, 
we then add other variables of intrinsic interest. 
Table 7 reports the results. The first column reports the benchmark specification 
which jointly includes a measure of country size (population), level of economic and 
financial development (real per capita income), openness (landlockedness), political regime 
(voice and accountability), and central bank size (staff; we obtain similar results for operating 
expenditures) to explain the size of the board. As shown, the results indicate that country 
size, a democratic political regime, and a large number of central bank staff are associated 
with larger MPCs, while landlocked and/or richer countries tend to have smaller boards. 
More notably, compared with the bivariate results, all variables (except for landlockedness) 
remain economically relevant and statistically highly significant. Finally, it should also be 
noted that our estimation results are derived from a still large sample of 83 observations. 
While the significance levels of individual variables later vary with the set of regressors (and 
sample size), the benchmark estimates generally turn out to be reasonably robust. 
Adding other control variables yields further insights. In column two, we experiment 
with an alternative control for country size, replacing population with land area. This 
modification has little effect on the overall estimation results, though the empirical fit 
appears to be somewhat stronger for some R2-measures. In the remaining columns, we report 
results for other variables of theoretical interest. Among those variables, the strongest results 
are found for central bank independence and ethnolinguistic fractionalization; the estimated 
coefficients on these variables take on the expected sign and are statistically highly 
significant. Also the exchange rate regime and the degree to which there are limits to central 
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bank financing of government debt appear to play (at least marginally) a significant role in 
explaining MPC size in a multivariate framework.38 In all cases, the results in Table 7 
confirm the (previously reported) direction of the bivariate relationship. Openness and the 
correlation of the national with the world business cycle, in contrast, remain unrelated to 
MPC size. 
Statistically, the overall fit of the multivariate models is encouraging. Pseudo-R2 
values (as measured by the McKelvey and Zavoina method) are between 0.3 and 0.6. An 
alternative measure, the Count R2, is generally even higher (in the 0.5 to 0.6 range), 
indicating that we are able to explain a considerable share of the variation in MPC size across 
countries.39
 
IV.   CONCLUSIONS 
Recent research emphasizes the importance of central bank design for the success of 
monetary policy. One of the features that have received particular interest is the membership 
size of the central bank’s decision-making body—that is, how many people should decide 
whether to take measures to achieve a specified monetary policy target? 
In theory, the membership size of an MPC depends on the costs and benefits of 
appointing members. On the benefit side, larger MPCs promise improvements in information 
processing along the lines of Condorcet’s jury theorem. At the same time, decision making 
typically becomes more difficult and time consuming as the number of MPC members 
                                                 
38 Government debt, which played a role in the bivariate setup, does not show a significant influence on MPC 
size in the multivariate model. 
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increases. Also, members may have a stronger incentive to “freeride” on the information-
processing efforts of others in larger MPCs. Since factors affecting the costs and benefits of 
board size are likely to differ across countries (e.g., the information-processing requirement 
might vary with the size and diversity of the economy), it seems reasonable to assume that 
also “the efficient size of a policy committee might vary across countries” (Goodfriend 2005, 
p. 85). 
Around the world, central bank boards do indeed come in different sizes. In New 
Zealand, for instance, the governor alone is responsible for policy-making, while the 
European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council currently comprises 19 members. 
Moreover, the pending increase in euro area membership has triggered a preemptive ECB 
reform that generally limits the overall number of voting members to 21. This, however, still 
seems to be a relatively large number compared with the membership size of other central 
bank decision-making bodies such as the U.S. Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market 
Committee. The average MPC in our sample of central banks has 7–9 members. 
In this paper, we characterize differences in the structure of central bank governance. 
Our analysis is based on a dataset that covers the (de jure) membership size of 84 central 
bank boards around the world at the end of 2003 that make decisions on whether to increase 
or decrease interest rates to achieve a specified target.40 We find that board size is indeed 
significantly and plausibly correlated to various country and central bank characteristics. For 
instance, MPC size tends to increase with country size and population heterogeneity, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                       
39 As a robustness check, we also performed (unreported) OLS regressions. While the coefficient estimates 
were qualitatively unchanged, the adjusted R2 values were typically on the upper end of that range. 
40 In a companion paper, Berger and Nitsch (2008), we examine the effect of various features of MPC design 
on the outcome of monetary policy. 
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providing empirical support for the notion that information-processing requirements affect 
central bank board size. There is also evidence that MPC size is correlated to political 
institutions, with more democratic countries having, on average, larger boards. For some 
variables, we find a hump-shaped effect on MPC size. 
Finally, although the size of the central bank’s policy committee has been the focus of 
much debate recently, there are indications that it should not be viewed as independent of 
other features of central bank design. MPC size is often associated with other central bank 
characteristics. For instance, central banks tend to have larger MPCs if they have more staff 
or higher operational expenditure. More importantly, countries with floating exchange rate 
regimes, which typically have more complicated monetary policy frameworks, also seem to 
operate larger boards. Along similar lines, we find that more independent central banks often 
have larger MPCs. Viewed in conjunction with the results discussed previously, this suggests 
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Table 1. Characterizing MPCs: Size 
 


















































Table 2. Characterizing MPCs: Heterogeneity 
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Table 3. Characterizing MPCs: Level of Development and Openness 
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Table 4. Characterizing MPCs: Political Regime 
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Table 5. Characterizing MPCs: Central Bank Characteristics 
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Table 5 (concluded). Characterizing MPCs: Central Bank Characteristics 
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Table 6. Quadratic Results 
Variable Coefficient 1 Std. dev. Coefficient 2 Std. dev. 
Population  0.018** (0.007) -0.00004# (0.00002) 
Area  0.172 (0.139)  0.005 (0.012) 
Real GDP (USD)  0.459 (0.362) -0.033 (0.035) 
Real GDP (PPP)  0.850# (0.443) -0.069 (0.042) 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization -0.218 (2.228)  1.538 (2.566) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, CH -0.010 (0.021)  0.0002 (0.0002) 
Ethnic Fractionalization, ADEKW -0.666 (2.733)  1.036 (3.197) 
Linguistic Diversity -4.954 (1.605)  0.818 (1.772) 
Linguistic Fractionalization -1.484 (1.609)  1.712 (1.876) 
Religious Fractionalization -2.340 (2.030)  3.652 (2.364) 
Gini Coefficient  0.031 (0.071) -0.0004 (0.0008) 
Geographic Dispersion  0.311 (3.785) -0.205 (3.494) 
Administrative Divisions  0.024* (0.011) -0.0001* (0.00005) 
Real GDP per capita (USD)  0.030 (0.038) -0.001 (0.002) 
Real GDP per capita (PPP)  0.043 (0.042) -0.001 (0.002) 
Human Development Index  1.027 (7.154) -0.411 (5.479) 
Urbanization  0.026 (0.020) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
M3  0.005 (0.010) -0.00003 (0.00005) 
Domestic Bank Credit -0.005 (0.006)  0.00002 (0.00002) 
Trade Openness -0.016# (0.008)  0.00005 (0.00003) 
Business Cycle Correlation  0.526 (0.416) -0.931 (1.322) 
Democracy  0.083 (0.136) -0.003 (0.014) 
Autocracy -0.155 (0.130)  0.011 (0.016) 
Polity  0.033 (0.024) -0.00009 (0.0041) 
Political Rights  0.096 (0.287) -0.023 (0.038) 
Civil Rights  0.553 (0.411) -0.086 (0.054) 
Economic Freedom  0.427 (1.969) -0.040 (0.150) 
Economic Security  4.039* (2.004) -3.713# (2.029) 
Voice & Accountability  0.196 (0.154) -0.255 (0.165) 
Political Stability  0.014 (0.140) -0.185 (0.127) 
Government Effectiveness  0.330* (0.140) -0.307* (0.128) 
Regulatory Quality  0.138 (0.173) -0.252# (0.136) 
Rule of Law  0.399** (0.145) -0.408** (0.146) 
Deficit -0.017 (0.024)  0.004 (0.004) 
Debt  0.029** (0.011) -0.0002* (0.00007) 
Central Bank Independence  1.251 (0.650) -0.233 (0.126) 
CB Independence Score  0.072 (0.045) -0.0004 (0.0003) 
Price Stability Focus  1.272 (2.055) -0.579 (1.760) 
Target Independence Score  3.192* (1.242) -3.087* (1.275) 
Instrument Independence Score  2.212 (1.861) -0.786 (1.646) 
Lim. CB Financing of Gov’t Deficit  7.912# (4.505) -5.437# (3.177) 
Term Length -0.590** (0.204)  0.040** (0.012) 
Staff  0.131** (0.043) -0.001# (0.0005) 
Staff % Population -1.902 (21.51) -73.4 (208.7) 
Staff % Population -1.902 (21.51) -73.4 (208.7) 
Operating Expenditures  1.909# (1.000) -0.0004# (0.0003) 
Notes: The table reports the results of an ordered probit regression of the following equation: 
MPC = α + β x + γ x2 + ε, where β is coefficient 1 and γ is coefficient 2. Standard errors are in parentheses. **, 
* and # denote significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively. Evaluation calculates β x + γ x2 based 
on the estimated coefficients and the mean of the respective variables—excluding those non-significant. 
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Table 7. Empirical Determinants of MPC Size 
 
         
Population  0.744** 
(0.254) 












Area   0.186* 
(0.081) 
      




































































Trade Openness   -0.004 
(0.003) 
     
Business Cycle 
Correlation 
   0.573 
(0.447) 
     
CB Independence 
Score 
    0.020* 
(0.009) 
    
Float’g Exchange 
Rate, LYS 
     0.482# 
(0.284) 
   









cing of Gov’t Def. 





        1.485* 
(0.618) 
         
         
Number 
Observations 
83 83 78 53 83 64 53 50 
Count R2 0.542 0.530 0.551 0.604 0.530 0.563 0.604 0.580 
Pseudo-R2 0.334 0.568 0.368 0.492 0.356 0.477 0.469 0.431 
Notes: Ordered probit regression. Dependent variable is board size index. Pseudo-R2 is the McKelvey and 
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APPENDIX I. COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE 
 
 Angola Namibia 
 Argentina Nepal 
 Armenia Nicaragua 
 Australia Nigeria 
 Bahamas, The Norway 
 Bahrain Oman 
 Barbados Pakistan 
 Bolivia Paraguay 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina Peru 
 Botswana Philippines 
 Brazil Poland 
 Bulgaria Qatar 
 Cambodia Romania 
 Canada Russian Federation 
 Cape Verde Rwanda 
 Chile Serbia and Montenegro 
 Colombia Sierra Leone 
 Croatia Singapore 
 Cyprus Slovenia 
 Czech Republic South Africa 
 El Salvador Sudan 
 Estonia Sweden 
 Fiji Switzerland 
 Georgia Tajikistan 
 Guatemala Tanzania 
 Honduras Trinidad and Tobago 
 Hungary Tunisia 
 Iceland Turkey 
 Jamaica Turkmenistan 
 Japan Ukraine 
 Jordan United Arab Emirates 
 Kazakhstan United Kingdom 
 Kenya United States 
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APPENDIX II. DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES 
 
Variable Description Source 
MPC Board size index; implementation board Lybek and 
Morris 
Population Total population Rose 
Area Land area Rose 
Real GDP (USD) Real GDP in US dollar Rose 
Real GDP (PPP) Real GDP in PPP terms Rose 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization, Mauro Rose 





Ethnic Fractionalization, Alesina et al. Rose 
Linguistic Diversity Linguistic Diversity, Ethnologue Rose 
Linguistic Fractionalization Linguistic Fractionalization, Alesina et al. Rose 
Religious Fractionalization Religious Fractionalization, Collier & 
Hoeffler 
Rose 
Gini Coefficient Gini Coefficient, CIA World Factbook Rose 
Geographic Dispersion Geographic Dispersion, Collier & 
Hoeffler 
Rose 




Real GDP per capita (USD) Real GDP per capita in US dollar, WDI Rose 
Real GDP per capita (PPP) Real GDP per capita in PPP terms, WDI Rose 
Human Development Index Human development index, UNDP Rose 
Urbanization Urban population/Total population, WDI Rose 
M3 M3/GDP, WDI Rose 
Domestic Bank Credit Domestic bank credit/GDP, WDI Rose 
Trade Openness (Exports+Imports)/GDP, WDI Rose 
Landlocked Dummy =1 if country is landlocked Rose 
Business Cycle Correlation Correlation with world GDP, 20-year 
average 
IFS 
Democracy Democracy index, Polity IV (10 = 
democratic) 
Rose 
Autocracy Autocracy index, Polity IV (10 = 
autocratic) 
Rose 
Polity Polity index, Polity IV (-10 = autocratic; 
10 = democratic) 
Rose 
Political Rights Political rights index, Freedom House Rose 
Civil Rights Civil rights index, Freedom House Rose 
Economic Freedom Freedom status, Freedom House Rose 
Economic Security Economic security index, ILO Rose 
Voice & Accountability Voice & Accountability, World Bank Rose 
Political Stability Political Stability, World Bank Rose 
Government Effectiveness Government Effectiveness, World Bank Rose 
Regulatory Quality Regulatory Quality, World Bank Rose 
Rule of Law Rule of Law, World Bank Rose 
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Deficit Overall budget balance/GDP, 10-year 
average 
WDI 
Debt Central government debt/GDP, 20-year 
average 
WDI 
Central Bank Independence Summary index (goal = 1; target = 2; 
instrument = 3; other = 4) 
Lybek and 
Morris 
CB Independence Score Independence score (0 = low; 100 = high) Fry et al. (BoE) 
Goal Independence Dummy = 1 if CB has goal independence Lybek and 
Morris 
Price Stability Focus Statutory/legal objectives focus on price 
stability? (0 = weak; 1 = strong) 
Fry et al. (BoE) 




Target Independence Score Independence score (0 = low; 1 = high) Fry et al. (BoE) 




Instrument Independence Score Independence score (0 = low; 1 = high) Fry et al. (BoE) 
Limited or No Autonomy Dummy = 1 if CB has goal independence Lybek and 
Morris 
Limited Central Bank Financing 
of Government Deficit 
Independence score (0 = low; 1 = high) Fry et al. (BoE) 
Authority over Exchange Rate 
Policy 
Dummy = 1 if CB has authority over 
exchange rate policy 
Lybek and 
Morris 
Goal Independence or Exchange 
Rate Policy Authority 
Dummy = 1 if CB has either goal 




Fixed Exchange Rate, RR Dummy = 1 if fixed exchange rate regime Reinhart and 
Rogoff 




Fixed Exchange Rate, LYS Dummy = 1 if fixed exchange rate regime Levy-Yeyati & 
Sturzenegger 




Fixed Exchange Rate, IMF Dummy = 1 if fixed exchange rate regime IMF 
Floating Exchange Rate, IMF Dummy = 1 if floating exchange rate 
regime 
IMF 
Term Length Term length of board members (de jure) Lybek and 
Morris 
Term Length in CB Law Dummy = 1 if term length stipulated in 
central bank law 
Lybek and 
Morris 
Staff Staff number Central Bank 
Directory 
Staff % Population Staff/Population Central Bank 
Directory & Rose 
Operating Expenditures Operating expenditures Ize 
Establishment Year Establishment year Central Bank 
Directory 
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APPENDIX III. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
MPC 84 2.85 0.87 1 5 
Population 98 37.44 132.02 0.27 1262.65 
Area 98 0.997 2.588 0.0004 17.075 
Real GDP (USD) 95 0.313 1.194 0.0004 10.300 
Real GDP (PPP) 93 0.430 1.308 0.002 10.300 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 62 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.93 
Ethnic Fractionalization, CH 77 36.92 27.70 0.00 93.00 
Ethnic Fractionalization, ADEKW 47 0.42 0.25 0.01 0.86 
Linguistic Diversity 98 0.43 0.29 0.003 0.99 
Linguistic Fractionalization 94 0.37 0.27 0.002 0.90 
Religious Fractionalization 97 0.46 0.23 0.002 0.86 
Gini Coefficient 74 40.00 10.83 24.40 70.00 
Geographic Dispersion 72 0.63 0.18 0.19 0.97 
Administrative Divisions 97 22.65 29.35 0 195 
Real GDP per capita (USD) 94 10.02 9.53 0.46 35.13 
Real GDP per capita (PPP) 97 7.48 10.09 0.13 39.32 
Human Development Index 74 0.74 0.17 .34 0.95 
Urbanization 98 59.10 22.60 6.15 100.00 
M3 85 48.80 38.26 8.17 193.41 
Domestic Bank Credit 94 65.14 57.20 3.83 317.22 
Trade Openness 91 83.14 38.08 20.18 228.88 
Landlocked 98 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Business Cycle Correlation 97 0.18 0.31 -0.49 0.80 
Democracy 90 6.03 3.78 0 10 
Autocracy 90 1.68 2.83 0 10 
Polity 90 4.36 6.36 -10 10 
Political Rights 98 3.18 2.09 1 7 
Civil Rights 98 3.36 1.69 1 7 
Economic Freedom 76 6.65 0.96 4.66 8.56 
Economic Security 58 0.52 0.23 0.05 0.98 
Voice & Accountability 98 0.14 0.92 -1.75 1.64 
Political Stability 96 0.17 0.98 -2.38 1.73 
Government Effectiveness 97 0.23 1.04 -1.58 2.48 
Regulatory Quality 98 0.25 0.91 -2.14 2.27 
Rule of Law 98 0.25 1.07 -1.52 2.22 
Deficit 82 -2.90 3.34 -13.65 10.85 
Debt 76 49.23 35.76 0 189.53 
Central Bank Independence 98 2.67 0.83 1 4 
CB Independence Score 93 73.5 16.2 24 98 
Goal Independence 98 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Price Stability Focus 93 0.76 0.20 0 1 
Target Independence 98 0.42 0.50 0 1 
Target Independence Score 93 0.58 0.31 0 1 
Instrument Independence 98 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Instrument Independence Score 93 0.82 0.29 0 1 
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Limited or No Autonomy 98 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Limited Central Bank Financing of 
Government Deficit 
93 0.76 0.27 0 1 
Authority over Exchange Rate Policy 98 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Goal Indep. or Exch. Rate Policy Auth. 98 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Fixed Exchange Rate, RR 98 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Floating Exchange Rate, RR 98 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Fixed Exchange Rate, LYS 98 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Floating Exchange Rate, LYS 98 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Fixed Exchange Rate, IMF 98 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Floating Exchange Rate, IMF 98 0.53 0.50 0 1 
Term Length 70 5.19 1.97 3 14 
Term Length in CB Law 98 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Staff 89 4.04 18.03 0.10 150.00 
Staff % Population 89 0.01 0.01 0.002 0.09 
Operating Expenditures 99 0.243 0.567 0.004 3.626 
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